ࡱ> |~{ nobjbj~~ $3c:w4(D+$OOOOO*Bl f**OOOOx,f0  NJ =:   Latour and Literary Intentionality: or the Scientist in the Submarine Allegories of Theory reading Nature Conference paper for SLSA 2010: short version In the following Ill be engaging a vast and somewhat immovable mound of literature with a very limited and specific claim, but one which nevertheless I think could apply to the pedagogy and critical practice of anyone engaged in literary studies today. The debate Im engaging, an old but never resolvable debate, is the specific discussion over literary intentionality within literary studies and textual hermeneutics. Essentially Ill be arguing that we know not what we do when when we talk about literary intentionality in the classroom and elsewherestill, 20 years after the last battle royale over literary intention in Critical Inquiry and elsewherebut that what we in fact do is quite defensible, on good theoretical grounds. I posit that we can find those grounds in object-oriented ontology in general and Bruno Latour and Actor-Network Theory (round 2) in particular. Let me begin with a brief prelude: {Prelude} Literary-critical problems, like literary works, have life-spans and afterlives: periods of vitality and periods of oblivion, brief explosions of interest followed by long years of neglect, ghostly revivals and undead states of semi-persistence. Certain problematics can dominate a century of critical production, like the neo-classical debates over the nature and necessity of the Aristotelian unities, only to be abandoned in a fit of Romantic pique. Critical problematics can die. Yet much like unread novels in the back of an archive, a dead problematic has the Gothic ability suddenly to spring into a renewed youth, rising from the dusty crypts of Theory to feast on the blood of living critics. Such has been the case with a category like affect, for example, which Wimsatt and Beardsley thought they had safely staked in its Shelleyan grave in 1947, only to see revive under the aegis of reader-response criticism decades later, a revival close accompanied by another fall and yet another rise within new models of affect theory. Such is also the case, I will claim, with the ghostly persistence of the problem of intentionality. Despite an uneasy post-structuralist disciplinary settlement of the old question of authorial intention, we are still haunted at a more basic level by the imp of intentionality: by its persistence in our pedagogy, by its recurrence in critical theories of orientation and ethics, and by the sticky resonance of intentional language in our critical accounts. The imp of the intentional wants out, despite all our best efforts to bottle it up. Fig. 1: MLA / ABELL citations in literary theory, by title keyword  Allow me to briefly set the scene on which the imp obtruded for me, beginning with a pedagogical parable, for reasons which will become clear. Recently I attended a lecture series by a highly respected moral philosopher who cogently argued, over the course of several days, that classic noir films like The Lady from Shanghai (Orson Welles, 1947) and Out of the Past (Jacques Tourneur, 1947) contain subtle, complex, and aesthetically rich presentations of many of the classic subjects of Western moral philosophythe nature of autonomy, individual fate versus social determination, the inescapability of ones own past actions, and so forth. The philosopher showed, at the very least, that one could talk about film noir as doing a kind of moral thinking, and that certain directors (Fritz Lang, Orson Welles) could be plausibly linked to classical or Continental traditions of moral philosophy. After the talk there was a scheduled luncheon with advanced students from across the university, and during this luncheon, though a few other questions on the treatment of the material and the place of this particular work in the larger corpus of this distinguished scholar were raised, it became clear that the main stage would be entirely taken up by the question of intentionality. The students brazenly asked: How can we say that a film wants to raise moral questions? How can a film want to raise anything? Isnt it a little easy to slide from what Scarlet Street shows us to what Fritz Lang intended? Arent we making some kind of basic mistake when we move so fluently from author-auteur to film to production techniques and back, in an account which claims to give us a coherent moral philosophical reading? How could a complex, highly mediated, profit-driven, cultural-and-technological assemblage, to use Deleuzes term, have an account of moral autonomy, of all things? Arent you making the jump from Langs interest in central-European philosophical traditions to an American genre film a bit too easily? Such were the questions from advanced graduate students; notably, none of the questioners were enrolled in literature or film studies departments, yet all felt the presence of the imp of the intentional fallacy which Beardsley and Wimsatt hoped to cap in the bottle some seventy years ago. The moral philosopher, to his credit, answered thoughtfully and without dismissal, but his answers were not entirely satisfying, and he clearly had a sense that this literary-critical flank might be weak. The moral philosophers difficulty is not his alone. In his recent comprehensive review of the problem of literary intentionality in the twentieth century, John Maynard has recently written of his experience of teaching the problem of intention, within a class on readers and reader theory: The issue can take two three-hour classes and then, like a thunderstorm hanging around on a summer day, it keeps rumbling and grumbling throughout the rest of term. Week after week every other discussion would regenerate into the earlier one, with the usual suspects asserting the death of the author and the usually suspicious asserting his/her authority (22). His quite thorough treatment of the issue in Literary Intention, Literary Interpretation, and Readers (2009), summarizing the range of twentieth-century debates over the issue, makes clear that even after the usual suspectsIser, Barthes, Derridahave spoken, intention remains a foundational question still very much up for scholarly debate as well. Ive recounted these literary-pedagogical episodes entirely to show my central, unsurprising, yet (for a literary theorist) startlingly persistent main problematic: we still have a slippy grasp, across several fields, on how to deal with the problem of the intentionality of complex cultural and material assemblages (noir films, scholarly texts, Joseph Cornell boxes, Brian Jungens ritual Air Jordan mask collages), on how exactly they want to claim or seem to mean. What we do have is disciplinary language and theoretical settlements that get around the problem either by staging it, or by doing away with authorial intention altogether (which is not an answer to the problem of the texts intentions), or by dismissing the hopeless navet of those unaware of the recent debate on the question and its satisfactory (one assumes) resolution in post-structuralist models of meaning-production. The reasons that all this should bother us (again) are the following: first, our (post)postmodern boredom with the very question of intentionality, I argue, merely covers over the resiliency of a real problem which should (and does) confront us in our everyday pedagogy as well as our interdisciplinary conversations: how do we describe the intentionless intentionality of non-human artifacts, complex technological assemblages, and highly mediated literary texts? The example of the eminent moral philosopher struggling to argue for the complexity of moral thought in Scarlet Street / the Langian script / the vagarities of actual production are evidence that intentionality remains a persistent problem for pedagogical practicenot a problem in need of resolution, but in need of an adequate theory and a considered practice. In the following, Ill briefly offer one possible argument which would reach toward a more adequate language for the intentionality of complex literary assemblages, not so much a solution as another framework, another way of speaking, to paraphrase Rorty, derived from the work of Bruno Latour and Actor-Network Theory. The first round of ANT theory has not offered a systematic account of intentionality and its oppositesindeed, the division between warm, human intentional agency and its opposite in the material world is one that ANT took as one of its cental bte noirs. In this initial negation, however, and in later forms of Latours project, we can find a grounding for discussing intentionality as a symmetrical feature of the human and non-human world, a recalcitrant spirit, or inevitable imp whom we should banish precisely through an invitation to proliferate in our accounts. (necessary but evitable phantom?) First, however, some fundamental clarifications. Im speaking here about literary intentionality, a specific problem within the theory and practice of the interpretation of texts; as John Maynard reminds us most recently and thoroughly, intentionality as a problem stretches back to 19th-century German historical hermeneutics and follows many paths into the twentieth century, some captured in E. D. Hirschs Validity in Interpretation (1967), some continental and in parallel, many intersecting in (what is as far as I can tell) the last major battle royale over theory and interpretation, the Against Theory controversy of the late eighties. Im not speaking about intentionality in the philosophical or psychological senses, as the aboutness of psychological states after Brentanos classic definition, though that discussion intersects the story of literary intentionality at several points. I wont rehearse the history of the twentieth-century controversies over literary intention at length: the New Critics and formalist critic tend to ban the discussion of specific authorial intention, most famously with Wimsatt and Beardsleys Intentional Fallacy, a critical non fiat still widely cited in popular texts as well as some scholarly work; the later Death of the Author manifestos in post-structuralist theories of meaning-formation take over and complete a de-centering of old-style authorial criticism. The last twentieth-century battle over intention was the Against Theory controversy, which Ill consider in more detail as a useful case study of disputed intentionalityin particular its central critical allegory, the so-called wave-poem. Examining that allegory at more length will allow me to pose the ANT model as a contrast, and an alternative literary epistemology in its own right. Against Theory (1982) {The basic argument itself, for those who have not read it recently, goes as follows, in this lightly edited summary of the first four paragraphs of the essay: Theory" is an attempt to govern interpretations of particular texts by appealing to an account of interpretation in general. In so doing, it attempts to solve, or celebrate the impossibility of solving, a set of familiar problems: the function of authorial intention, the status of literary language, the role of interpretive assumptions, and so on. But in fact, these are not real problems, because their component elements are inseparablebut theorists fail to recognize this. The best example is the debate about "authorial intention and the meaning of texts. Both the project to ground meaning in intention (Hirsch) and the project to deny the possibility of recoverable authorial intention and therefore also to deny the possibility of valid interpretations (de Man) must fail, because neither recognize that the meaning of a text is simply identical to the authors intended meaning. Since meaning and intention turn out, at least for Earthlings, to be inextricable, one can neither succeed nor fail in deriving one from the other, since to have one is already to have them both. Therefore, the theoretical argument over the issue is misguided, and as the paradigmatic case of theory shows how all other such arguments will fail in the same way. Therefore the whole enterprise of critical theory is misguided and should be abandoned.} *One basis thrust of this argument, to simplify considerably, is that meaning and intention are inseparable in fact, and that therefore we can imagine no case of non-human meaning. (The Derridean counter-case was made by many readers ) The grounding for this conclusion depends on a very specific ontological constitution, and a specifically modern separation of agency, intention, and Natureone which I get into in the longer version of this essay. To support their argument, Knapp and Michaels proposed a central thought experiment, which employs Wordsworths A Slumber Did My Spirit Seal (1799). Lets follow their reading, briefly, and then Ill contrast their approach to one which makes use of a Latourian ontology. They set out the thought experiment this way: Suppose that youre walking along a beach and you come upon a curious sequence of squiggles in the sand. You step back a few paces and notice that they spell out the following words: A slumber did my spirit seal; I had no human fears: She seemed a thing that could not feel The touch of earthly years. What comes next is more questionable: the imagined walker reads through the lines first as intentionless writing (why?), produced by something, undoubtedly, but without the question of intention becoming a problem. Then, however, a second wave washes up and recedes, leaving: No motion has she now, no force: She neither hears nor sees; Rolled round in earths diurnal course, With rocks, and stones, and trees. One might ask, Knapp and Michaels say, whether the question of intention still seems as irrelevant as it did seconds before. You will now we suspect, feel compelled to explain what you have just seen. Are these marks mere accidents, produced by the mechanical operation of the waves on the sand? Or is the sea alive and striving to express its pantheistic faith? You might go on extending the list of explanations indefinitely, but you would find, we think, that all the explanations fall into two categories. You will either be ascribing these marks to some agent capable of intentions or you will count them as nonintentional effects of mechanical properties But in the second casewhere the marks now seems to be accidentswill they still seem to be words? They go on to separating out intentional acts, which are synonymous with meaning, from accidental marks, caused by mechanical processes and without meaning. Here we come upon the critical hinge-point of their argument, as well as the crux at which it becomes an interesting problem for a Latourian (and science studies) critic. Signs are either intentional, that is ascribed to some (mind-having) author, or meaningless because produced by accidental mechanical processes. We note that alongside the shade of Wordsworth and the operation of mere chance, they give, to their credit, what seems to be the most realistic answer for the majority of human sign-readers: the living sea is striving to express itself perhaps even its pantheistic faith! However, the humanist on the beach is saved from taking this latter answer seriously by a sudden appearance on the scene: a submarine surfaces on the waves, and she sees scientists pop up waving their hands and shouting we did it, we did it!(cite). All is clear; the intolerable paradox resolves: human intentionality, and some scientists odd poem-inscribing wave device, was behind the marks on the sand all along. It was an experiment in the attribution of intention all along, testing our materialist/humanist only momentarily. Whether or not we should be philosophically satisfied by this closure of the scene of meaning is debatable, of course, but Knapp and Michaels claim that we are satisfied hermeneutically, and also should be satisfied. Now, in a longer version of this paper I analyze this proffered example at more length as an allegory of critical theory reading Nature, one which offers up its divisions symptomatically to a Latourian reading. Here, however, Id like to consider rather what the preferred alternative solution of a Latourian literary critique might be: what alternative version of intentionality might we offer, and on what grounds? Can we simply say that nonhumans have their intentions too? That the wave could indeed proclaim its pantheistic faith? Thats what many, perhaps most of the imaginable readers of the scene would believe, I think. But we are critics and need a more critical account of textual hermeneutics. Before answering, lets first take the question of whether ANT has a theory of nonhuman intentionality, either in its earlier phase from (say) 1979 to 1999 or in its more recent versions and revisions. Even in the foundational papers the problem of intention is replete: Callons seminal paper on the domestication of scallops in St. Briec Bay, for example, wavers on the edge of imputing motive and intention to the scallops which have to be enrolled in the scientific study, using a language of interressement which explicitly recalls the political language of unionization and political action. Ashmore (1993) on cat-flaps and Latour (in Bijker and Law, Shaping Technology/Building Society, 1992) on the electronic door-opener as well as in Aramis (1996) certainly came in for critique as imputing humanlike intentions to nonhumans, in what some called a self-indulgent pantheism. In response to the threat of being seen as truly nonmodern, cranks or savages harmonizing with the rocks and trees around them, ANT practitioners made an explicit break between agency and intentionality: that is, a scallop or ax or tree could be and should be an agent in an ANT account, an actor that makes a difference, but that would have no implication for intentionality, a specifically human or perhaps animal property with all the psychological and philosophical baggage included. Some practitioners make this explicit: so that Andrew Pickering in Mangle of Practice (1995), for example, talks of ordinary intentionalityplans and goals, in the everyday sense of the termas what his nonhuman assemblages dont have, because of their lack of future-oriented temporality: human intentionality, then appears to have no counterpart in the material realm, with his primary case as machines (17-18). (Its not clear at all, by the way, that material objects like DNA or viruses or algorithms have no future-oriented temporality; Whitehead and others would differ, no doubt). Hetherington (1997), in discussing the will-to-connect as a particular form of agency devoid of intentionality, makes surface inscriptions the distinctive feature of non-human oriented agency: The agency of things does not come from within but from the inscriptions generated by a heterogenous network upon its blankness (214). Both these stances seem to rescue non-human agency from the imputation of radical intentional pantheism. Nevertheless, I want to (first) remember that the issue of literary intentionality, which in the strong senseafter Wimsatt and Bearsley and the death of authorial criticismremains always a hermeneutical issue about texts, that is, about nonhumans, obvious though the point may seem. Second, I will argue that in fact the issue remains considerably less settled then that in some areas of ANT theory, and in the later work of Bruno Latour in particular we find theoretical grounds for treating the textual issue of intentionality as symmetrical for humans and non-human actorswhich is in fact, I should say, what literary scholars already do in practice. Already in Actor Network Theory and After, a kind of valedictory for the first phase of ANT theory, Latour reminds his readers that actantiality was never a way of simply activating the inert or giving agency to the voiceless: Actantiality is not what an actor doeswith its consequence for a demiurgic version of ANTbut what provides actants with their actions, with their subjectivity, with their intentionality, with their morality. (18) Action is overtaken, in other words, as Latour puts it in Reassembling the Social: our motivations, our beliefs, our thoughts, our intentions, all arise elsewhere and are transmitted by long chains of human and nonhuman agents. Human intentionality is no more local, agentive, and causal than nonhuman passivity, and the intersubjective encounter or intrasubjective locus cannot be privileged as the house of the human. Human intentionality, then, becomes in this account at least a second-order feature of the topology and vibrancy of the human and nonhuman worlds in combination, the re-assembled Social at which Latour hopes to aim. Symmetry of the account is at issue here: in second-wave science studies, Latour argues, subjectivity and corporeality is no more a property of humans and individuals than being outside reality is a property of nature (20). The account in Re-assembing the Social, the fullest exposition of Latours revised actant-rhizome ontology, extends and deepens this position on the displacement of the source of actions and their justifications. Nevertheless, of course, actors report that they have intentions, beliefs, subjectivity and will, and that they are knowingly intending to do things all the time. Do we discount these claims, knowing that these are merely effects produced elsewhere, in a long chain of nonapparent causes? Here lies one of the other radical, but also saving, implausibilities of Latours version of ANT: all accounts of action and figured agency are treated as real and plausible, in the vocabulary of the actors themselves, which is to say that the global forces of society, the transparent calculations of the self, the intentionality of the person, the Unconscious, or God are all possible actors at the scene of an event (RS 47). Not being modern, in this particular sense, means that we allow the ascription of agency and the belief in nonhuman intentions equal priority with the self-reported interiority and subjectivity of our human agents. Were pretty far away from Wordsworth here; all of this latter material, of course, has a disciplinary location in sociology and science and organization studies, where written accounts of the words and deeds of social actors, their meetings and spreadsheets and internet connections and so on, are the raw data for a scholarly account. How might all this function in the context of literary criticism and hermeneutics? Id like us to remember that, as John Maynards recent account of literary intentionality in Literary Intention, Literary Interpretation, and Readers (2009) reminds us, we have long been accustomed, by post-structuralist theory and also by New Criticism, to speak of the text as an animate actor: the text performs, it believes, it speaks, and so forth; we speak of The Prelude as having intentions on its readers, and Ulysses as a kind of mindful machine. As my prelude was meant to indicate, what we still seem to have a problem with is justifying our intentional language about literary artifacts, as well as hooking up authorial intention with the intentionality of texts themselves. What I think that Latours later theory fully justifies is what we might call the intentional-textual stance, to modify a phrase associated with Daniel Dennett in cognitive science; we can accept a descriptive ontology which operates as if poems and fictions have intentional behavior, with no proviso for what we really believe about the reality of authorial intention, or fictional intention, or the reciprocal play of the text and reader. The reason that the problem of literary intentionality has been so persistant, I believe, the reason for the ever-present intrusion of the Imp of the intentional, has been our resiliently non-modern relation to the texts we study at every level of reading, our sense that they resist us, that they obtrude, even that they have intentions: rather than the ghost of the author, we are dealing with the animatedness of a world inhabited by meaningful materiality, by what Jane Bennett calls vibrant matter. Its one in which the wave can write its pantheistic faith without the need for scientists in submarines to come to its rescue. What Latour and an ANT account offers us, in literary-theoretical terms, is justification and support for our fundamentally non-modern relation to the objects of our study: our veneration for their sense of warmth, their interior life, their humanity, even our sense that they might be sacred, or perhaps demonic. Our sense of the intentions of others, in other words, always a matter of second-degree reconstruction and displaced agency, can equally be attributed to human and non-human actorsintentions both real and overtaken by the material facts of their production and displaced action. That we could simply believe in the intentions of our texts, without having to believe in disbelief: thats the literary ANT proposal, as I would put it.  See The Affective Fallacy, 1947; the original collaboration between Wimsatt and Beardsley began in an article in a Dictionary of World Literature (Shipley 1942), followed by The Intentional Fallacy, 1946.  See Brian Jurgen, collages entitled Prototypes for a New Understanding, 1998-2005.  See Lyons, 1995, Introduction, for a similar stance within analytic philosophy: 5.  This move in the argument seems, unfortunately, to separate out the moments of meaning and intention within K and Ms argument, which is precisely what they had just accused Hirsch of doing.  This posited critic is part of the project of this essay, as well as forthcoming  Callon, Michel (1986), 'Some Elements of a Sociology of Translation: Domestication of the Scallops and the Fishermen of Saint Brieuc Bay', in Power, Action and Belief: a new Sociology of Knowledge? Sociological Review Monograph 32, edited by John Law, 196-233. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.  Hetherington, K. Museum Topology and the Will To Connect. Journal of Material Culture 2.2 (1997): 199-218. 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